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Abstract. The authenticated encryption scheme COLM is a third-round candidate
in the CAESAR competition. Much like its antecedents COPA, ELmE, and ELmD,
COLM consists of two parallelizable encryption layers connected by a linear mixing
function. While COPA uses plain XOR mixing, ELmE, ELmD, and COLM use a
more involved invertible mixing function. In this work, we investigate the integrity
of the COLM structure when unverified plaintext is released, and demonstrate
that its security highly depends on the choice of mixing function. Our results are
threefold. First, we discuss the practical nonce-respecting forgery by Andreeva et
al. (ASIACRYPT 2014) against COPA’s XOR mixing. Then we present a nonce-
misusing forgery against arbitrary mixing functions with practical time complexity.
Finally, by using significantly larger queries, we can extend the previous forgery to
be nonce-respecting.
Keywords: Integrity · Release of unverified plaintext · COLM · COPA · ELmD ·
ELmE
1 Introduction
Authenticated encryption schemes, which target both data confidentiality and integrity
simultaneously, have received considerable attention over the last years. The increased
interest is in part due to the ongoing CAESAR competition [CAE14], which aims to deliver
a portfolio of state-of-the-art authenticated encryption schemes covering a spectrum of
security and efficiency trade-offs.
Whereas the security of conventional authenticated encryption schemes, such as OCB1-
3 [RBBK01,Rog04,KR11] and GCM [MV04], breaks down if a nonce is used twice, new
schemes offer varying degrees of robustness when nonces are reused [FFL12,ABL+13,RS06,
HRRV15]. Albeit different levels of confidentiality in the nonce misuse setting may be
required depending on the application, the CAESAR competition explicitly mentions that
data integrity should never be sacrificed [Ber16].
Schemes implemented in particularly vulnerable environments might demand even
stronger security requirements, as described by one of the CAESAR competition’s use
cases [Ber16], which lists security under release of unverified plaintext (RUP) [ABL+14]
as being highly desirable. A RUP-secure authenticated encryption scheme does not leak
meaningful information even if its decryption algorithm outputs decrypted ciphertext
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2 Understanding RUP Integrity of COLM
Table 1: Summary of our RUP attacks against the COLM type structure. All attacks
succeed with overwhelming probability
Mixing Nonce
Complexity (ignoring constants)
Reference
Encrypt Decrypt Length (blocks)
XOR respecting 1 2 2n [ABL+14], Section 4
any misusing 4n 4n 3n Section 5
any respecting 1 2n (n+ 1)n Section 6
regardless of whether the authentication tag is verified. Such security is particularly
desirable in settings where one has not enough memory to store the entire (unverified)
plaintext [FJMV03] or for stream-wise authenticated encryption [TSS09]. Related ideas
that imply RUP security are schemes that are secure even when multiple distinguishable
decryption failures are allowed [BDPS13], or any scheme satisfying robust authenticated
encryption [HKR15] (see Barwell et al. [BPS15] for an overview).
Various popular schemes have been shown to be vulnerable in the RUP setting. An-
dreeva et al. [ABL+14] showed that OCB does not achieve RUP integrity, and Chakraborti
et al. [CDN16] presented a RUP integrity attack on any authenticated encryption scheme
that makes one block cipher query per message block. For some recent authenticated
encryption schemes, such as AEGIS [WP13], ALE [BMR+13], FIDES [BMR+13], and
OCB [KR13], the designers explicitly note that unverified plaintexts should not be released.
For many authenticated encryption schemes, however, the situation is unknown.
1.1 Our Contribution
Central to this work is the CAESAR submission COLM by Andreeva et al. [ABD+15], a
merge of the CAESAR submissions COPA [ABL+15,ABL+13] and ELmD [DN15,DN14].
COLM is a block cipher based design that consists of two layers of parallelizable encryption,
connected by a linear mixing functionality. The general structure of COLM is given in
Figure 1. Here, E is an n-bit block cipher, K denotes the key, N the nonce, A associated
data, M the message, C the ciphertext, and T the tag. The linear mixing layer is a
sequential evaluation of linear functions ρ : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n. In this
work, we focus on a generalized linear function of the form
ρ(X,W ) = (Y,W ′) = (a ·X ⊕ b ·W , c ·X ⊕ d ·W ) ,
for some a, b, c, d 6= 0. A detailed description of the generic COLM type structure
is given in Section 3. CAESAR submission COLM [ABD+15] uses the instantiation
(a, b, c, d) = (1, 3, 1, 2) (see Section 3.1 for further minor differences). Likewise, COPA is
covered by setting (a, b, c, d) = (1, 1, 1, 1), which corresponds to XOR mixing, and ELmE
and ELmD by (a, b, c, d) = (1, 3, 1, 2) (disregarding details which are irrelevant for this
paper, cf., Section 3.2 and Section 3.3).
COLM and its antecedents are proved to be online authenticated encryption schemes
resistant against nonce-misuse adversaries. In this work, we investigate the RUP integrity
of the COLM type structure. Although the COLM designers did not claim any RUP
security [ABD+15], Bossuet et al. [BDMN16] suggested that ELmD may be RUP secure.
It turns out that COLM’s RUP integrity strongly depends on the choice of ρ, and we
analyze it for various classes of functions. The results are summarized in Table 1. We
remark that the attacks below only affect the COLM type structure without intermediate
tags and refer to Remark 1 for further discussion on COLM with intermediate tags.
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4 COLM
N A1 Aa−1 Aa M1 M2 Mm M1⊕···⊕Mm
C1 C2 Cm T
3L 2·3L 2a-13L 2a3L
EKEK EK EK EKEKEKEK
ρρρρ
2L 22L
2·32L 2232L
2m-17L 2m7L
2m-1327L 2m327L
EKEK EKEK
Figure 1: COLM[ρ] type structure for integral data. Here, L = EK(0).
Nonce-Respecting Attack for XOR Mixing. In Section 4 we consider the case of XOR
mixing, i.e.,
ρ(X,W ) = (X ⊕W,X ⊕W ) ,
and present a nonce-respecting forgery that makes 1 encryption query and 2 decryption
queries, all of length about 2n blocks. We remark that Andreeva et al. [ABL+14] already
claimed that their attack against OCB could be directly generalized to COPA. In more
detail, they observed that both OCB and COPA generate the tag using the XOR of message
blocks, and that therefore the same attack strategy applies. The attack we describe in
Section 4 implements this generalization.
Nonce-Misusing Attack for Any Mixing. In Section 5 we consider arbitrary mixing
function ρ and present a nonce-misusing forgery in about 4n encryption and 4n decryption
queries, all of length at most about 3n blocks. The crux of the attack is that, regardless of
the mixing function, one can generate a state collision after 3 message blocks with only 4
encryption and 4 decryption queries. The attack generalizes the previous one in the sense
that it also applies to XOR mixing, however, the current attack is in the nonce-misuse
setting while the former attack is in the nonce-respecting setting.
Nonce-Respecting Attack for Any Mixing. The nonce-misusing forgery relies on the
observation that different queries may have colliding states after triples of blocks, and
it does not work in the nonce-respecting setting. In Section 6 we extend our focus, and
present a nonce-respecting attacker that makes 1 encryption query and 2n decryption
queries, and that forges with the same success probability. The attack differs from the
nonce-misusing attack in that our new adversary makes significantly larger queries, i.e.,
of about n2 blocks. The attack covers any mixing function, and in particular the 1312
mixing used in CAESAR submission COLM and its predecessors ELmE and ELmD:
ρ(X,W ) = (X ⊕ 3W,X ⊕ 2W ) .
2 Notation and Security Model
For n ∈ N, we denote by {0, 1}n the set of bit strings of size n. Let GF(2n) be the
finite field of order 2n. An element a = an−1 · · · a1a0 ∈ {0, 1}n can be represented as a
polynomial a(x) = an−1xn−1 + · · ·+ a1x + a0 ∈ GF(2n). Likewise, a can be represented
by an integer in {0, . . . , 2n − 1} which is the evaluation of the polynomial a at x = 2.
For two elements a, b ∈ {0, 1}n, addition a⊕ b is defined as addition of the polynomials,
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a(x) + b(x) ∈ GF(2n). Multiplication a ⊗ b is defined with respect to the irreducible
polynomial f(x) used to represent GF(2n): a(x) · b(x) mod f(x).
By P(n) we denote the set of all permutations on {0, 1}n. For a finite set A, a $←− A
denotes the uniform random drawing of an element a from A. An adversary AO is a
probabilistic algorithm that has query access to an oracle, or list of oracles, O.
2.1 Block Ciphers
For k, n ∈ N, a block cipher E : {0, 1}k × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n is a mapping such that
EK = E(K, ·) is a permutation for every K ∈ {0, 1}k. Its security is captured by the SPRP
security, which measures the distance between EK , E−1K for random key K
$←− {0, 1}k and
pi, pi−1 for a random permutation pi $←− P(n). The attacks in this work are generic, and
do not rely on potential weaknesses in the block cipher that is used in the authenticated
encryption schemes.
2.2 Authenticated Encryption
We focus on authenticated encryption in the context of the release of unverified plaintext
(RUP), and as in [ABL+14] we separate the decryption algorithm into plaintext computation
and verification functionalities. An authenticated encryption scheme AE is a triplet of
algorithms AE = (E ,D,V), where:
E : (K,N,A,M) 7→ (C, T ) ,
D : (K,N,A,C, T ) 7→M ,
V : (K,N,A,C, T ) 7→ >/⊥ .
Here, K is a key, N a nonce, A associated data, M a message, C its ciphertext, and
T the verification tag, and it is required that D(K,N,A, E(K,N,A,M)) = M and
V(K,N,A, E(K,N,A,M)) = > for any K,A,M .
The conventional security properties of AE are confidentiality, that ciphertexts are
indistinguishable from random, and integrity, that a tag is unforgeable. In this paper
we focus on integrity in the RUP setting, which differs from conventional integrity by
giving the adversary access to the plaintext-computation algorithm D in addition to the
encryption E and verification V algorithms.
Definition 1. Let AE = (E ,D,V) be an authenticated encryption scheme. The INT-RUP
advantage of an adversary A is defined as
INT-RUPAE(A) = Pr
(AEK ,DK ,VK forges) , (1)
where A may not make a query of the form VK(N,A,C, T ) where EK(N,A,M) = (C, T ) is
a previous encryption query, and where “forges” represents the event that some VK -query
returns >.
We say the adversary is nonce-respecting if it does not repeat nonces across encryption
queries, otherwise the adversary is said to be nonce-misusing. We remark that the adversary
may always repeat nonces in queries to DK and VK .
3 COLM Type Structure
COLM is an authenticated encryption scheme by Andreeva et al. [ABD+15], and a
CAESAR competition contestant. It is a merge of two earlier CAESAR submissions,
COPA [ABL+15,ABL+13] and ELmD/ELmE [DN15,DN14]. We consider a generic COLM
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type structure, and demonstrate how it covers CAESAR submission COLM, as well as
COPA and ELmD/ELmE.
The generic COLM type structure consists of two-layer parallelizable encryption masked
with the subkey L = EK(0) and a counter. COLM mixes the output of the first encryption
layer to generate the input to the second encryption layer, using the linear mixing function
ρ : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n, where
ρ(X,W ) = (Y,W ′) = (a ·X ⊕ b ·W , c ·X ⊕ d ·W ) , (2)
with a, b, c, d 6= 0. The mixing function can be graphically depicted as follows:
X
↓
W → ρ →W ′ = c ·X ⊕ d ·W
↓
Y = a ·X ⊕ b ·W
By COLM[ρ] we denote this generic COLM type structure with mixing function ρ. For
the case of integral data, where the associated data consists of a blocks and the message
of m blocks, COLM[ρ] is depicted in Figure 1. Here, state values are denoted by Wi, the
message inputs to ρ by Xi, and the ciphertext outputs of ρ by Yi.
3.1 COLM
CAESAR submission COLM [ABD+15] follows the above generalized structure with the
difference that Mm is replaced by the entire checksum as well, and with the following
mixing function:
ρ1312(X,W ) = (X ⊕ 3W,X ⊕ 2W ) . (3)
We remark that the encryption of two checksums (rather thanMm followed by its checksum)
is merely syntactic and does not influence the attacks in this work.
3.2 COPA
The COPA [ABL+15,ABL+13] authenticated encryption scheme differs slightly from the
COLM type structure in three aspects:
• It is not based on a nonce; the processing of associated data starts one block earlier;
• The compression of associated data is performed PMAC-style: the evaluation of EK
on the last associated data block is moved to the state. Additionally, the secret key
L is XORed into the state afterwards;
• The maskings 2i3j7k are slightly different.
These aspects do not violate generality. As a matter of fact, the attacks performed in
this work are always done for the same associated data and thus state value W0, and the
attacks do not make use of any property of the masking values. Leaving aside these minor
aspects, COLM covers COPA via mixing function
ρ⊕(X,W ) = (X ⊕W,X ⊕W ) . (4)
For completeness, COPA is depicted in Figure 2.
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1 COPA
A1 A2 Aa−1 Aa M1 M2 Mm M1⊕···⊕Mm
C1 C2 Cm T
33L 2·33L 2a-233L 2a-134L
L
3L 2·3L 2m-13L 2m-132L
2L 22L 2mL 2m-17L
EK EK
EK
EK
EKEK EKEK
EKEKEKEK
Figure 2: COPA for integral data. Here, L = EK(0).2 ELmD
N A1 Aa−1 Aa M1 M2 Mm M1⊕···⊕Mm
C1 C2 Cm T
3L 2·3L 2a-13L 2a3L L 2L 2m-1L 2mL
32L 2·32L 2m-132L 2m32L
0
1
EKEK EK EK EKEKEKEK
E−1KE
−1
K E
−1
KE
−1
K
ρρρρρρρρ
Figure 3: ELmD for integral data. Here, L = EK(0).
3.3 ELmD/ELmE
ELmD is an authenticated encryption scheme by Datta and Nandi [DN15]. It is closely
related to the ELmE construction by the same authors [DN14], that in turn is closely
related to COPA but differs in various fundamental aspects. In more detail, ELmD closely
follows the COLM type structure of Figure 1, with the following differences:
• The mixing function ρ is also used for the compression of associated data;
• The maskings 2i3j7k are slightly different, and in addition, 1 is XORed right before
the last call to E in order to prevent length extension attacks (for COLM and
COPA this is not needed as security against length extension attacks is done via the
masking);
• In the encryption part, the lower-layer block ciphers are evaluated in inverse direction.
As before, these aspects do not violate generality, as our attacks are always done for the
same associated data and thus state value W0. Leaving aside these minor aspects, COLM
covers ELmE/ELmD via mixing function ρ1312 of (3). For completeness, ELmD is depicted
in Figure 3.
4 Nonce-Respecting INT-RUP Attack for XOR Mixing
We prove that COLM with the XOR mixing function ρ⊕ of (4) is insecure under the
release of unverified plaintext. The attack directly applies to COPA and in fact matches
the suggested generalization of the attack by Andreeva et al. [ABL+14] against OCB.
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Theorem 1. Let `, n ≥ 1 be such that ` is even and ` ≥ 2n. There exists a nonce-respecting
adversary A such that
INT-RUPCOLM[ρ⊕](A) ≥ 1− 2n−`/2 , (5)
where A makes 1 encryption query and 2 decryption queries, each of length ` blocks.
Proof. We will construct an adversary A that makes all queries for the same associated
data. As a first step A fixes arbitrary N∗, A∗, and M∗ = M∗1 · · ·M∗` ∈ {0, 1}n·` and
queries
(C∗1 · · ·C∗` , T ∗)← EK(N∗, A∗,M∗1 · · ·M∗` ) .
A will succeed if it can construct
(N∗, A∗, C1 · · ·C`, T ∗) (6)
with C` = C∗` and for which the corresponding decrypted message M1, . . . ,M` satisfies⊕`
i=1Mi =
⊕`
i=1M
∗
i . Indeed, from inspection of Figure 2, we see that the forgery of (6)
succeeds if
E−1K (C` ⊕ 2`L)⊕ E−1K (T ∗ ⊕ 2`−17L) = EK
(⊕`
i=1
Mi ⊕ 2`−132L
)
,
but this holds due to the choice of C` = C∗` and the condition that
⊕`
i=1Mi =
⊕`
i=1M
∗
i .
A proceeds as follows:
1. Randomly choose n-bit strings C0i and C1i such that C0i , C1i , and C∗i are mutually dis-
tinct for i ∈ {1, 3, . . . , `−1}, and define the ciphertexts C0 = C01C∗2C03 · · ·C∗`−2C0`−1C∗`
and C1 = C11C∗2C13 · · ·C∗`−2C1`−1C∗` ;
2. Make the following two plaintext-computation queries (note that the tag input to D
is redundant and omitted for simplicity):
M∗,01 M
0,∗
2 M
∗,0
3 · · ·M∗,0`−1M0,∗` ← DK(N∗, A∗, C0) ,
M∗,11 M
1,∗
2 M
∗,1
3 · · ·M∗,1`−1M1,∗` ← DK(N∗, A∗, C1) ,
where we remark that in COLM[ρ⊕], the ith message block is obtained from the
(i− 1)th and ith ciphertext block for i ≥ 2, and from A and the 1st ciphertext for
i = 1;
3. Set b0 = b2 = · · · = b` := ∗, and find b1, b3, . . . , b`−1 ∈ {0, 1} such that
⊕`
i=1
M
bi−1,bi
i =
⊕`
i=1
M∗i . (7)
This is a set of n equations with `/2 unknowns which can be solved using Gaussian
elimination. This system of equations has a solution with probability at least
1− 2n−`/2 [BM97, App. A];
4. Output forgery
(N∗, A∗, Cb11 · · ·Cb`−1`−1 Cb`` , T ∗) .
The forgery is successful by design, and the attack works provided that (7) has a solution.
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5 Generalized Nonce-Misusing INT-RUP Attack
We present a nonce-misusing INT-RUP attack against COLM with arbitrary linear mixing
function ρ as described in Eq. (2). The attack is much more general than that of Section 4,
and as a result is more complex and requires nonce-misuse. The attack crucially relies on
a sub-procedure to generate non-trivial state collisions for messages/ciphertexts consisting
of 3 blocks. This procedure will first be discussed in the next lemma.
Lemma 1. Let N be any nonce, A any associated data, M01 ∈ {0, 1}n any message block,
and consider the following four queries to COLM[ρ] (ignoring tags):
C01C
0
2C
0
3 ← EK(N,A,M01 ? ?) ,
M11M
1
2M
1
3 ← DK(N,A, ?C02?) ,
M21M
2
2M
2
3 ← DK(N,A, ? ? C03 ) ,
C31C
3
2C
3
3 ← EK(N,A, ?M12M23 ) ,
where a ? represents any n-bit string. Then, the third state of the final query, W 33 , is
independent of M01 .
Proof. Consider Figure 1 and denote the input values to ρ by Xji . Denote the state values
by W ji , where W 00 = W 10 = W 20 = W 30 =: W0 since the nonce and associated data input
are kept constant throughout. We have:
W 33 = c ·X33 ⊕ d ·W 32
= c ·X33 ⊕ cd ·X32 ⊕ d2 ·W 31
= c ·X33 ⊕ cd ·X32 ⊕ cd2 ·X31 ⊕ d3 ·W0 .
In the second EK query, the second and third message blocks are M12 and M23 , respectively,
therefore we know that X32 = X12 and X33 = X23 . Furthermore, Y 12 = Y 02 and Y 23 = Y 03
since the first and second DK-queries use C02 and C03 in their input. Therefore
X33 = X23 = a−1 ·
(
Y 23 ⊕ b ·W 22
)
= a−1 · (Y 03 ⊕ b ·W 22 ) ,
X32 = X12 = a−1 ·
(
Y 12 ⊕ b ·W 11
)
= a−1 · (Y 02 ⊕ b ·W 11 ) ,
and so
W 33 = a−1c ·
(
Y 03 ⊕ d · Y 02
)⊕ a−1bc ·W 22 ⊕ a−1bcd ·W 11 ⊕ cd2 ·X31 ⊕ d3 ·W0 . (8)
Note that
Y 03 ⊕ d · Y 02 =
(
a ·X03 ⊕ b · (c ·X02 ⊕ d · (c ·X01 ⊕ d ·W0))
)
⊕ d ·
(
a ·X02 ⊕ b · (c ·X01 ⊕ d ·W0)
)
= a ·X03 ⊕ (bc⊕ ad) ·X02 ,
and (8) satisfies
W 33 = c ·X03 ⊕ a−1c(bc⊕ ad) ·X02 ⊕ a−1bc ·W 22 ⊕ a−1bcd ·W 11 ⊕ cd2 ·X31 ⊕ d3 ·W0 .
These values are all independent of M01 by construction.
In order for Lemma 1 to apply, we need to query EK and DK under the same nonce and
in a particular order. The rationale behind the attack is that the value X01 coming from
the first query contributes to the state value in the second and third query at different
places, and by clever composition of the last encryption query, it eventually disappears for
that query.
We can make two important observations on Lemma 1:
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1. At the cost of four encryption queries, and four decryption queries, each of length 3
blocks (plus the prefixed associated data), one can derive two tuples M1M2M3 6=
M ′1M
′
2M
′
3 such that their final states satisfy W3 = W ′3. This is done by applying
Lemma 1 to two distinct messages M01 6= M01 ′, where the two applications are
performed for the same messages at the ? positions, and by subsequently defining
M1M2M3 := M31M12M23 and M ′1M ′2M ′3 := M31M12
′
M23
′
.
Note that, indeed, we must keep M31 the same in both applications of the procedure:
the final states of the two evaluations are independent of M01 and M01
′, but they do
depend on whatever is entered at the ?’s;
2. The two queries of above observation need not necessarily been done for the same
nonce and associated data, as long as the state value prior to the compression of
the first message block, W0, is the same for all queries. Likewise, suppose that
M,M ′ ∈ {0, 1}n·α are two distinct messages for which EK(N,A,M) = C and
EK(N,A,M ′) = C ′ have the same αth state Wα = Wα, one can prependM (resp. C)
to the encryption (resp. decryption) queries corresponding to the message M01 , and
likewise M ′ and C ′ for the queries corresponding to message M01
′, and the resulting
tuples M1M2M3 6= M ′1M ′2M ′3 satisfy that M ‖M1M2M3 and M ′ ‖M ′1M ′2M ′3 have
the same final state Wα+3 = Wα+3. We will refer to this principle as “stretching the
collision.”
Using Lemma 1, and particularly above two observations, we can derive our nonce-misusing
attack on COLM.
Theorem 2. Let `, n ≥ 1 be such that ` ≥ 3n. There exists a nonce-misusing adversary
A such that
INT-RUPCOLM[ρ](A) ≥ 1− 2n−`/3 , (9)
where A makes 4`/3 + 1 encryption queries and 4`/3 decryption queries, each of length at
most ` blocks.
Proof. Define µ = `/3 and assume, without loss of generality, that µ is integral. We will
construct an adversary A that makes all queries for the same nonce and associated data.
Inspired by Lemma 1, the attack will be performed in chunks of 3 blocks, where we will
use an overline (M) to make explicit that we are referring to a chunk.
At a high level, the attack consists of two parts. In the first part, the adversary A
constructs two messages M01 · · ·M
0
µ ∈ {0, 1}n·3µ and M
1
1 · · ·M
1
µ ∈ {0, 1}n·3µ that satisfy
W 03i = W 13i for all i = 1, . . . , µ. These two messages will be constructed chunk-wise. Then,
in the second part, the adversary uses a trick comparable to that in Theorem 1 to construct
a forgery with the correct checksum.
As a first step, A fixes any nonce N and associated data A.
• First chunk. Using observation (1), obtain two message chunks M01 6= M
1
1 that
satisfy W 03 = W 13 . The step consists of 2 executions of the procedure of Lemma 1;
• ith chunk for i = 2, . . . , µ. Using observation (2) we stretch the collision as
follows: for M = M01 · · ·M
0
i−1 and M ′ = M
1
1 · · ·M
1
i−1, obtain two message chunks
M
0
i 6= M
1
i for which
EK(N,A,M ‖M0i ) and EK(N,A,M ′ ‖M
1
i )
have the same (3i)th state W 03i = W 13i. For each iteration, the step consists of 2
executions of the procedure of Lemma 1;
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• We have now obtained two messages M0 = M01 · · ·M
0
µ and M1 = M
1
1 · · ·M
1
µ such
that M0i 6= M
1
i and W 03i = W 13i for all i = 1, . . . , µ;
• Fix any M = M1 · · ·M` ∈ {0, 1}n·` such that M 6∈ {M0,M1}, and query
(C, T )← EK(N,A,M) .
We will use T as our target tag;1
• Find b1, . . . , bµ ∈ {0, 1} such that
µ⊕
i=1
M bi3i−2 ⊕M bi3i−1 ⊕M bi3i =
⊕`
i=1
Mi . (10)
This is a set of n equations with µ unknowns which can be solved using Gaussian
elimination. This system of equations has a solution with probability at least
1− 2n−µ [BM97, App. A];
• Output forgery
(N,A,Cb11 · · ·C
bµ
µ , T ) .
The forgery is successful by design, and the attack works provided that (10) has a solution.
It consists of 2µ = 2`/3 applications of the procedure of Lemma 1, each of which costs
2 encryption and 2 decryption queries. In addition, one encryption query is made to
determine T .
6 Generalized Nonce-Respecting INT-RUP Attack
In addition to the result of Section 5, it turns out that the COLM type structure can
also be attacked in the nonce-respecting setting, be it with messages of length at least n2
blocks. The attack resembles ideas of the attack against ELmE with intermediate tags
in [DN14, Section 5.2]. Just like the attack of Section 5, the new attack also consists
of a sub-procedure in Lemma 2 to derive colliding state values, but to comply with the
condition that nonces should never be repeated in encryption queries, queries are only
made in inverse direction.
The attack is given in full generality, i.e., for arbitrary primitive polynomial f(x) and
for any ρ of the form (2). An easier to grasp version of the proof for ρ1312 of (3) (but still
arbitrary primitive polynomial) is given in Appendix A.
Lemma 2. Denote the primitive polynomial by f(x) = xn + xκ1 + · · ·+ xκl for some even
l and n > κ1 > · · · > κl = 0.2 Let N be any nonce, A any associated data, and consider
the following two queries to COLM[ρ] (ignoring tags):
M01 · · ·M0n+1 ← DK(N,A,C01C02 · · ·C0n+1) ,
M11 · · ·M1n+1 ← DK(N,A,C11C02 · · ·C0n+1) ,
where C01 6= C11 and the Cji ’s may take any value. There exists a partition {1, . . . , n+ 1} =
I0 ∪ I1 such that the query
C21 · · ·C2n+1 ← EK(N,A,M211 · · ·M2n+1n+1 ) ,
where 2i = 0 if i ∈ I0 and 2i = 1 if i ∈ I1, forms a collision on the (n+ 1)th state with the
second query: W 1n+1 = W 2n+1.
1The step is in fact redundant, but it aids the comprehensibility of the attack.
2Note that if l were odd, f(x) is divisible by x+ 1, whereas if κl > 0, f(x) is divisible by x. In both
cases, f(x) would not be a primitive polynomial.
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Proof. Consider Figure 1 for any linear mixing ρ, where, without loss of generality,
a, b, c, d 6= 0. Define e = a−1bc ⊕ d and denote the input values to ρ by Xji , the output
values by Y ji , and the state values by W
j
i , where W 00 = W 10 = W 20 =: W0 by construction.
Without loss of generality, we will select sets I0 and I1 such that 1 ∈ I0. We have:
W 2n+1 = cX
2n+1
n+1 ⊕ cdX2nn ⊕ · · · ⊕ cdnX211 ⊕ dn+1W0
(1)= a−1c
(
Y
2n+1
n+1 ⊕ a−1bcY 2n+1n ⊕ · · · ⊕ a−1bcen−1Y 2n+11 ⊕ benW0
)
⊕ a−1cd
(
Y 2nn ⊕ a−1bcY 2nn−1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ a−1bcen−2Y 2n1 ⊕ ben−1W0
)
⊕ · · ·
⊕ a−1cdn−1
(
Y 222 ⊕ a−1bcY 221 ⊕ beW0
)
⊕ a−1cdn
(
Y 211 ⊕ bW0
)
⊕ dn+1W0
(2)=
n+1⊕
i=2
n−i⊕
j=0
a−2bc2djen−i−j ⊕ a−1cdn+1−i
Y 0i
⊕ Ξ0 · Y 01 ⊕ Ξ1 · Y 11
⊕
(
a−1bcen ⊕ a−1bcden−1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ a−1bcdn ⊕ dn+1
)
W0 ,
where (1) holds as
X2ii = a−1Y
2i
i ⊕ a−2bcY 2ii−1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ a−2bcei−2Y 2i1 ⊕ a−1bei−1W0 , (11)
(2) holds as Y 1i = Y 0i for i = 2, . . . , n+ 1, and where
Ξ0 :=
⊕
i∈I0\{1}
a−2bc2dn+1−iei−2 ⊕ a−1cdn ,
Ξ1 :=
⊕
i∈I1
a−2bc2dn+1−iei−2 =
n−1⊕
j=0
a−2bc2djen−1−j ⊕ a−1cdn
⊕ Ξ0 .
(Note that Ξ0 includes the term a−1cdn, which comes from the fact that 1 ∈ I0.) An
identical reasoning, again relying on (11), shows that
W 1n+1 =
n+1⊕
i=2
n−i⊕
j=0
a−2bc2djen−i−j ⊕ a−1cdn+1−i
Y 0i
⊕
n−1⊕
j=0
a−2bc2djen−1−j ⊕ a−1cdn
Y 11
⊕
(
a−1bcen ⊕ a−1bcden−1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ a−1bcdn ⊕ dn+1
)
W0 ,
and thus that W 1n+1 ⊕W 2n+1 = Ξ0 · (Y 01 ⊕ Y 11 ). Recall that e = a−1bc ⊕ d and define
f = ed−1. We obtain that
ac−1d−nΞ0 =
⊕
i∈I0\{1}
a−1bcd−1(a−1bcd−1 ⊕ 1)i−2 ⊕ 1
=
⊕
i∈I0\{1}
(f ⊕ 1)f i−2 ⊕ 1 . (12)
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Due to our assumption that a, b, c, d 6= 0, we have f 6= 1. If we can prove the existence of
a subset I ′0 ⊆ {0, . . . , n− 1} such that⊕
i∈I′0
f i = (f ⊕ 1)−1 , (13)
then for I0 = {1}∪{i+ 2 | i ∈ I ′0}, the term of (12) equals 0, and we obtain W 1n+1 = W 2n+1.
Remains to prove the existence of a set I ′0 such that (13) holds. Denote F2 = GF(2)
and F2n = GF(2n) for brevity. Consider the field F2(f), which is a subfield of F2n . As
f 6= 1, (f ⊕ 1)−1 ∈ F2(f), and thus there is a polynomial
p(f) = bn−1fn−1 + bn−2fn−2 + · · ·+ b1f + b0
for b0, . . . , bn−1 ∈ {0, 1} such that p(f) = (f ⊕ 1)−1. Here, we used that f is an element of
a field which has dimension n over F2, and thus that the smallest degree polynomial over
F2 with f as a root is at most n. The proof is completed by putting I ′0 = {i | bi = 1}.
Lemma 2 structurally differs from Lemma 1. Whereas for Lemma 1 the second, third,
and fourth query were carefully composed to eliminate the dependency on X01 , in the
current setting we cannot make two encryption queries under the same nonce. Instead,
The procedure consists of making two decryption queries, and compose their outcomes
depending on the actual primitive polynomial, in such a way that the difference initiated
by the first block “fades away” after n iterations.
The procedure of Lemma 2 can be used to derive, at the cost of two decryption queries
of length n+ 1 blocks, two tuples M1 · · ·Mn+1 6= M ′1 · · ·M ′n+1 such that their final states
satisfy Wn+1 = W ′n+1. This is done by defining
M1 · · ·Mn+1 := M11 · · ·M1n+1 and M ′1 · · ·M ′n+1 := M21 · · ·M2n+1 .
The ciphertext corresponding to the first message is known: C1 · · ·Cn+1 := C11C02 · · ·C0n+1.
The ciphertext corresponding to M ′1 · · ·M ′n+1 is unknown, and the adversary should
not make the corresponding encryption query for nonce N in order not to violate the
nonce-respecting condition. Fortunately, there is no need to do so: the “stretching”, as
it was done in Section 5, works without knowing C ′1 · · ·C ′n+1. In more detail, denote
the (n + 1)-block message and ciphertext chunks by (M,C) and (M ′, C ′), where C ′ is
unknown. Alongside observation 2 after Lemma 1, one can prepend C = C1 · · ·Cn+1 to
the ciphertexts in the two decryption queries, and subsequently obtain two new tuples
M1 · · ·Mn+1 6= M ′1 · · ·M ′n+1 such that
M ‖M1 · · ·Mn+1 ,M ‖M ′1 · · ·M ′n+1 ,M ′ ‖M1 · · ·Mn+1 ,M ′ ‖M ′1 · · ·M ′n+1
have the same 2(n+ 1)th state. In other words, the stretching has been performed without
making any encryption query. We can use this idea to derive our nonce-respecting attack
on COLM.
Theorem 3. Let `, n ≥ 1 be such that ` ≥ (n + 1)n. There exists a nonce-respecting
adversary A such that
INT-RUPCOLM[ρ](A) ≥ 1− 2n−`/(n+1) , (14)
where A makes 1 encryption query and 2`/(n+ 1) decryption queries, each of length at
most ` blocks.
Proof. Define µ = `/(n+ 1) and assume, without loss of generality, that µ is integral. We
will construct an adversary A that makes all queries for the same nonce and associated
data. The attack is fairly similar to that of Theorem 2, with the difference that in the
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current proof chunks of n+ 1 blocks are involved, and an overline (M) refers to a chunk of
n+ 1 blocks. In more detail, in the first part of the attack, the adversary A constructs
two messages M01 · · ·M
0
µ ∈ {0, 1}n·(n+1)µ and M
1
1 · · ·M
1
µ ∈ {0, 1}n·(n+1)µ that satisfy
W 0(n+1)i = W 1(n+1)i for all i = 1, . . . , µ. The second part of the attack, where a correct
checksum is developed, is fairly identical to that of Theorem 2.
As a first step, A fixes any nonce N and associated data A.
• First chunk. Using Lemma 2, obtain two message chunks M01 6= M
1
1 that satisfy
W 0n+1 = W 1n+1. Note that the ciphertext corresponding to M
0
1 is known, the
ciphertext corresponding to M11 is not known;
• ith chunk for i = 2, . . . , µ. Using above stretching observation for M =
M
0
1 · · ·M
0
i−1 and M ′ = M
1
1 · · ·M
1
i−1 (i.e., by prepending the ciphertext C cor-
responding to M to the two decryption queries in Lemma 2) obtain two message
chunks M0i 6= M
1
i for which
EK(N,A,M ‖M0i ) and EK(N,A,M ′ ‖M
1
i )
have the same (n+ 1)ith state W 0(n+1)i = W 1(n+1)i. Note that these two encryption
queries are not actually made. The ciphertext corresponding to M ‖M0i is known,
the ciphertext corresponding to M ′ ‖M1i is not known;
• We have now obtained two messages M0 = M01 · · ·M
0
µ and M1 = M
1
1 · · ·M
1
µ such
that M0i 6= M
1
i and W 0(n+1)i = W 1(n+1)i for all i = 1, . . . , µ;
• Fix any M = M1 · · ·M` ∈ {0, 1}n·` such that M 6∈ {M0,M1}, and query
(C, T )← EK(N,A,M) .
We will use T as our target tag;
• Find b1, . . . , bµ ∈ {0, 1} such that
µ⊕
i=1
 n⊕
j=0
M bi(n+1)i−j
 = ⊕`
i=1
Mi . (15)
This is a set of n equations with µ unknowns which can be solved using Gaussian
elimination. This system of equations has a solution with probability at least
1− 2n−µ [BM97, App. A];
• Output forgery
(N,A,Cb11 · · ·C
bµ
µ , T ) .
The forgery is successful by design, and the attack works provided that (15) has a
solution.
Remark 1. CAESAR submission COLM as described in Section 3.1 is in fact the plain
COLM0 of [ABD+15]. The specification also introduces COLM127, a variant which
produces intermediate tags after every 127 blocks. If the scheme would generate tags
after every n = 128 blocks, above attack could be refurbished to break authenticity of the
scheme (in a similar vein as the attack in [DN14, Section 5.2]).
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7 Conclusion
We remark that the attacks of Sections 4-6 do not exploit any specific properties of the
part that compresses the associated data; they just “start” from the state W0 initial to the
first message block encryption. This means that the attacks also work if more advanced
compression of the associated data is performed.
The nonce-respecting forgery attack of Section 6 consists of queries of length more
than (n+ 1)n blocks. In particular, the rationale behind the attack is that if a difference
between two evaluations is set at some point, it requires n subsequent iterations for this
difference to fade away. To make sure that the checksum at the end of the evaluation
matches, n of such blocks of length n+ 1 are required. This rationale suggests two possible
future directions for achieving a RUP secure variant of the COLM type structure: (i)
restricting to queries of length at most n2 blocks, and (ii) transforming the state through
cryptographic primitive EK after every n blocks.
The second direction is in fact related to the fact that COLM with intermediate tagging
generates intermediate tags after every n− 1 blocks [ABD+15]: it effectively prevents a
difference to fade away right before the generation of an intermediate tag.
A Lemma 2 for 1312 Mixing
We present a simplified version of Lemma 2 specifically focused on ρ1312 of (3). This
version particularly applies to CAESAR submission COLM [ABD+15]) which uses primitive
polynomial f(x) = x128 + x7 + x2 + x + 1.
Lemma 3. Denote the primitive polynomial by f(x) = xn + xκ1 + · · ·+ xκl for some even
l and n > κ1 > · · · > κl = 0.3 Let N be any nonce, A any associated data, and consider
the following two queries to COLM[ρ1312] (ignoring tags):
M01 · · ·M0n+1 ← DK(N,A,C01C02 · · ·C0n+1) ,
M11 · · ·M1n+1 ← DK(N,A,C11C02 · · ·C0n+1) ,
where C01 6= C11 and the Cji ’s may take any value. Define
I0 := {1} ∪ {n+ 1− (κ1 − 1), . . . , n+ 1− κ2} ∪ · · · ∪ {n+ 1− (κl−1 − 1), . . . , n+ 1− κl} ,
I1 := {1, . . . , n+ 1}\I0 .
and consider the following query:
C21 · · ·C2n+1 ← EK(N,A,M211 · · ·M2n+1n+1 ) ,
where 2i = 0 if i ∈ I0 and 2i = 1 if i ∈ I1. Then, the (n + 1)th state of the second and
third query satisfy W 1n+1 = W 2n+1.
Proof. Consider Figure 1 and denote the input values to ρ1312 by Xji , the output values by
3Note that if l were odd, f(x) is divisible by x+ 1, whereas if κl > 0, f(x) is divisible by x. In both
cases, f(x) would not be a primitive polynomial.
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Yi, and the state values by W ji , where W 00 = W 10 = W 20 =: W0 by construction. We have:
W 2n+1 = X
2n+1
n+1 ⊕ 2X2nn ⊕ · · · ⊕ 2nX211 ⊕ 2n+1W0
(1)=
(
Y
2n+1
n+1 ⊕ 3Y 2n+1n ⊕ · · · ⊕ 3Y 2n+11 ⊕ 3W0
)
⊕ 2
(
Y 2nn ⊕ 3Y 2nn−1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ 3Y 2n1 ⊕ 3W0
)
⊕ · · ·
⊕ 2n−1
(
Y 222 ⊕ 3Y 221 ⊕ 3W0
)
⊕ 2n
(
Y 211 ⊕ 3W0
)
⊕ 2n+1W0
(2)= Y 0n+1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ Y 02 ⊕ Ξ0 · Y 01 ⊕ Ξ1 · Y 11 ⊕W0 ,
where (1) holds as
X2ii = Y
2i
i ⊕ 3Y 2ii−1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ 3Y 2i1 ⊕ 3W0 , (16)
(2) holds as Y 1i = Y 0i for i = 2, . . . , n+ 1, and where
Ξ0 :=
⊕
i∈I0\{1}
2n+1−i3⊕ 2n ,
Ξ1 :=
⊕
i∈I1
2n+1−i3 =
(
n−1⊕
i=0
2i3⊕ 2n
)
⊕ Ξ0 .
An identical reasoning, again relying on (16), shows that
W 1n+1 = Y 0n+1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ Y 02 ⊕ Y 11 ⊕W0 ,
and thus that W 1n+1 ⊕W 2n+1 = Ξ0 · (Y 01 ⊕ Y 11 ). Because of our primitive polynomial, and
as l is even, we have
Ξ0 = 2n ⊕
(
2κ1−13⊕ · · · ⊕ 2κ23
)
⊕ · · · ⊕
(
2κl−1−13⊕ · · · ⊕ 2κl3
)
= 2n ⊕
(
2κ1 ⊕ 2κ2
)
⊕ · · · ⊕
(
2κl−1 ⊕ 2κl
)
= 0 ,
and thus that W 1n+1 = W 2n+1.
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